17 thoughts on "Proposed resolution condemning the cancellation of Professor Eric Cheyfitz’s classes and threats of further severe disciplinary action"

1. I respectfully urge the Faculty Senate to vote in favor of this Resolution.

   I find the resolution’s interpretation of the finer points of the procedural question persuasive and I strongly object to the administration’s overweening move of superseding the established procedures and the committee’s decision in order to relitigate the settled case in a forum where faculty adjudication of matters concerning their peers and conduct in the classroom count for basically nothing.

   Setting aside the byzantine legalistic framework, for me the narrative is clear and deeply unsettling. The administration intervened by fiat to protect the civil rights of an egregious class disruptor over the academic freedom and civil rights of all the rest of the students in the class, to the point of in effect removing the professor from his position as punishment. This seems to me patently unjust, tyrannical, and a terrifying precedent, or perhaps more precisely, a precedent whose intent is to instill terror and silence speech.

   It’s worth reading the letter published in the Sun in which the rest of the students in the class provide their points of view:
   https://www.cornellsun.com/article/2025/10/we-took-cheyfitz-class-on-gaza-his-suspension-violates-academic-freedom

   Log in to Reply

2. How can we vote yes for a resolution that includes whereas resolutions that contains whereas resolutions that are not complete, thus misleading voters, or are inaccurate.

   Why the they versus they mentality. We voted some of the “administration” into office and the leaders of our university are faculty members themselves.

   Log in to Reply

3. I wrote for the other members of my department, a narrative of the events discussed in this resolution, as I have understood them, and an explanation of why I support this resolution. You probably have heard all of this before. But I have decided to post it — for whatever it is worth — here. It may (or may not) be of interest.

   1. A complaint was filed with the Cornell Office of Civil Rights (hereafter COCR), under Cornell Policy 6.4, against Prof. Eric Cheyfitz (hereafter EC), alleging EC discriminated against a student based on national origin. This charge was investigated by the Cornell Office of Civil Rights (hereafter COCR). It reported to the Dean of CAS (Peter Loewen) and to the Provost (Kavita Bala), finding that EC was “guilty”, applying a “preponderance of the evidence” standard; but it refrained from recommending any sanction.
   2. Under Policy 6.4, EC had the right to appeal that finding to the Academic Freedom & Professional Status of the Faculty Committee (hereafter AFPFS Committee), which operates under the standard of “clear and convincing evidence”. EC so appealed.
   3. The AFPFS Committee found that the evidence was insufficient to support a “guilty” finding, and so (of course) proposed no sanction.
   4. Policy 6.4 requires (see part 12.2) that the Dean accept the findings of the AFPFS Committee. It does not articulate in what such acceptance consists. But presumably it at least required the Dean to drop the matter in this case. That is the whole point to a successful appeal of a ruling! That policy also allows the Dean to modify a sanction or sanctions proposed by the AFPFS committee; but since the latter didn’t propose any sanctions, there was nothing for the Dean to modify.
   5. The Dean did not drop the matter. He recommended to the Provost, based on the finding of the COCR, that the Provost place EC on an unpaid two-semester leave. This constitutes a failure to accept the findings of the AFPFS Committee.
   6. The Provost then initiated another investigation of EC’s behavior, this one under Faculty Handbook 6.6 procedures, this time for alleged discrimination based on national origin and also, a charge that the Provost added, for alleged discrimination based on viewpoint. It is reasonable to infer (inference 1) that had the findings of the AFPFS committee been “guilty as charged”, there would have been no action taken under the FH6.6 process against Prof. Cheyfitz for the same conduct that figured in the earlier investigations. So, it is reasonable to infer (inference 2) that the Provost initiated the latter action because Prof. Cheyfitz was not “found guilty” by the Committee. In which case the Provost’s action was a means of “getting around” a finding that the Provost didn’t like. Perhaps one could call it vindictive prosecution. (I wrote ‘perhaps’ because I am not endorsing so calling it.) I am willing to call it acting in bad faith.
   7. Policy 6.4 does not say that the Provost must accept the findings of the AFPFS Committee. But this prosecution was a analogous to double jeopardy: the relevant actions of EC, and the relevant evidence, did not differ from those in play in the investigation concerning EC’s purported violation of Policy 6.4. For this reason, it was objectionable.
   8. Furthermore, the Provost cancelled EC’s classes for academic year 2025-26, based on the findings of the COCR on its original investigation. She did this before the investigation under the FH6.6 process had concluded reached a finding. Note: EC’s salary payments were not stopped. Some might regard being relieved of teaching while been paid as more of a benefit than a burden. But many members of the faculty would not. Be that as it may, this was clearly intended as a punishment. I do not know whether this action violated any written Cornell policy. But as a case of punishment imposed before judgement, it was objectionable.
   9. The Faculty Senate should express their disapproval of the Dean’s action described under 5 above, and of two actions by the Provost, described under 6 and 8 above. By censuring the central administration, the Faculty Senate would make it more likely that, in the future, missteps like those cited above would not be made.

   Log in to Reply

   • Interestingly, this order of events directly contradicts that suggested above by Dr. Schaffer, namely in that Dr. Schaffer suggests that the suspension was suggested following the initial investigation (in which a preponderance of evidence was found to support the civil rights claim being made), while this claims the suspension was suggested following the second investigation (in which clear and compelling evidence was not found to support the civil rights claim being made).

     Re: point 5, it continues to be very important to remember that the AFSPF did not overrule the initial investigative committee. To do so, it would have had to ask the exact same question, and come to a different conclusion. Instead, the AFSPF chose to ask a different question – did the claim meet a higher evidentiary standard – and found that it did not. The dean thus had that information – that the claim did not meet a higher standard – but at no point was the dean ever told that it did not meet the FIRST standard. Because the AFSPF never asked that question, nor did they answer it. The dean was entirely able to accept the AFSPF findings as fact, and STILL be faced with the reality that the alleged misconduct met the initial evidentiary standard, which is what federal law expects sanctions to be based on. Which appears to be exactly what happened. It seems to me that passing the matter up the chain of command, to the provost, which is functionally consistent with the appeals procedures allowed in 6.4, and with the entirety of handbook section 6.6, was a not unreasonable action.

     Point 4 also runs into the problem that policy 6.4 does not say, anywhere, that a sanction suggestion of ‘no sanction’ cannot be modified by the dean. Perhaps it should, but it doesn’t. It explicitly says the opposite that the dean or head of unit can modify the sanction, full stop. So I’d ask, once again, if you could highlight the text in some other Cornell policy which supports your viewpoint that 6.4 should be interpreted to only allow the dean or head of unit to modify a sanction if a non-zero sanction was suggested. This text is missing from 6.4, but I am willing to concede that it may well exist in some other policy document of which I am not aware, and would be curious to have anyone at all share what that document is.

     Log in to Reply

4. From: Chris B. Schaffer, Faculty Senator for Biomedical Engineering

   Dear Colleagues,
   I thank members of the Faculty Senate and the broader University community for the robust and considered debate of this resolution. It has taken me some time to come to a decision about how to vote, and I am writing to share my perspective.

   This resolution centers on whether the Cornell administration followed published procedures in evaluating this case. The retirement settlement that was reached left much of the process outlined in our procedures incomplete.

   As I understand the facts, at the time of the retirement settlement, the professor:
   1. was paid a full salary and was not under suspension
   2. planned to offer classes in Fall 2025 and was prevented from doing so by the Provost and A&S Dean
   3. was investigated for discrimination based on national origin under Policy 6.4 by COCR and found responsible
   4. was presented with recommended sanctions (2 semester suspension without pay), but these had not yet been implemented
   5. appealed the COCR decision to the Academic Freedom and Professional Status of the Faculty Committee, which accepted the appeal and found insufficient evidence to find the professor responsible (with a higher evidentiary standard than COCR); again, no sanction was implemented at the time of the settlement
   6. was in the process of being investigated for failing to uphold ethical and professional standards under Faculty Handbook section 6.6, with an accusation of “viewpoint discrimination;” this process was halted at the time of the settlement

   I have several concerns with the approach taken by the administration.

   First, I have potential concerns about the dual adjudication paths employed here. I could understand a rationale for two separate accusations and two separate processes in this case, distinguishing between discrimination based on national origin and based on viewpoint relative to a class topic. These charges could be based on different facts or actions alleged to occur, thus warranting two investigations. On the other hand, if this is two parallel investigations of the same underlying alleged actions, then I would have preferred just a single adjudication process, in the interests of fairness. Without access to additional information, I cannot judge this. The administration could have cleared this up, without disclosing details, by indicating whether the same facts and alleged actions were the basis for both procedures or not.

   Second, I am concerned the Provost/Dean felt it was necessary to prevent the professor from teaching while these cases were being resolved. I think it is clearly within the purview of a Dean or the Provost to reassign faculty roles (in this case, a semester focused on scholarship with no teaching responsibilities, at full pay). In this case, however, the reassignment seems clearly intended to keep this professor out of the classroom due to a fear that additional policy violations may occur. This is a concerning use of power.

   Third, I am concerned about some of the language I have heard from the Provost and General Counsel about the obligation to follow the procedures outlined in our policies. In particular, at the Oct. 8 Senate meeting, the Provost stated that Cornell would be “violating Federal antidiscrimination law” if the Academic Freedom Committee’s decision was accepted. I think a fairer statement would be that we would have decided a case based on an evidentiary standard that is different from the one the Federal government would use in its own investigation. This would, as I understand it, open the University to potential legal liability, but would not “violate” existing law. The heavy-handed language used by the Provost to discuss the evidentiary standards issue lacked this important nuance. In addition, at the Oct. 22 Senate meeting, the General Counsel described some of the language in Policy 6.4 as a “compromise” between Counsel’s office and faculty committees that was “tolerated” by Counsel’s office, and brought this up in the context of the Academic Freedom Committee’s decision being deemed deficient. I believe that areas of contention that require hard-fought compromise in our policies are exactly the places where we need to most closely adhere to the written letter of the procedures, and I am concerned that the tone of the General Counsel’s comments were not aligned with this view.

   While I have disagreements about these choices made by the administration, I do not see these decisions as violating our policies. At the time of accepting a retirement settlement, the professor had received only a reassignment away from teaching duties. More significant sanctions had certainly been discussed and publicly justified as appropriate, and this pressure may have influenced the professor’s choice to reach a settlement with the administration, but no actions were taken against the professor other than the reassignment away from teaching. As such, I do not see where our policies were violated. While I disagree with some of the decisions made by the administration in handling the case, these disagreements do not, for me, rise to the level of justifying censure, so I will vote against the resolution. I join calls to improve these policies and procedures so we can avoid such a tangled mess in the future.

   Sincerely,
   Chris Schaffer

   Log in to Reply

   • Thank you. I admit, it sounds somewhat of legal sophistry to me regarding the allowed use of different legal standards. If we can judge at standard A, but will face legal liability unless we judge at standard B, are we truly allowed to judge at standard A?

     Perhaps this is why the general counsel used words like how it would be wise to use standard B – since using standard A just leads to legal problems very quickly down the road. If I can drive down any road I like, but will face penalties unless I choose the third road, am I really free to drive down any road I like?

     Either way, as you say – the issue may be muddy, the decisions may be disagreeable, but the fact remains that policy wasn’t violated.

     Log in to Reply

5. Comment submitted by Risa Lieberwitz, a co-sponsor of the Resolution:

   I urge the Faculty Senate to vote in favor of this Resolution.

   The Resolution is not about relitigating the complaint against Prof. Cheyfitz, which was fully considered and decided by our Faculty Senate Committee on Academic Freedom and Professional Status of the Faculty (AFPSF). The AFPSF Committee hearing panel unanimously concluded (6-0) that the University administration failed to prove its complaint against Prof. Cheyfitz.

   What the Resolution is about is our shared commitment to procedural fairness and due process, faculty governance, and academic freedom. This Resolution is about more than one person. The Resolution recognizes the importance of a fair process whether or not we agree with the political views of one of our colleagues. It is also about our joint commitment to procedures that exist for a reason—and that is to preserve faculty governance – through a hearing by our peers – as a check on centralized administrative power to unilaterally impose the most severe sanctions on one of our colleagues.

   It is during times of extreme stress that our policies and procedures are tested. This is a time when academic freedom, due process, and faculty governance matter most – including our respect for the role of the Faculty Senate Academic Freedom Committee to conduct a hearing about serious charges brought against our faculty peers.

   Unfortunately, at the Faculty Senate meeting, rather than addressing the Resolution, Provost Bala and University Counsel Varner spent most of their time attempting to relitigate the complaint against Prof. Cheyfitz. They unfairly characterized the case based on selected snippets of the case that supported their viewpoint. By doing this, they showed complete disrespect for Cornell Policy 6.4, under which the Faculty Senate Committee had concluded that the University did not prove their complaint, based on a full hearing of witness testimony and documentary evidence. As noted in the Resolution, Policy 6.4 clearly states, “The dean or equivalent unit head must accept the [AFPSF] Committee’s findings of fact and conclusions.” In complete disregard for this mandate, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences disregarded the mandate of Policy 6.4 and instead recommended to the Provost that Professor Cheyfitz be suspended without pay for two semesters.

   When the Dean and the Provost disagreed with the unanimous findings of the Committee on Academic Freedom under Policy 6.4, the Provost announced that there would be new proceedings under the Faculty Handbook sec. 6.6, which grants far less power to the faculty committee that hears the allegations, and which grants the President unfettered power to accept or reject their findings. The announcement of these new proceedings violated principles of double jeopardy and due process. The Provost further violated due process by cancelling Professor Cheyfitz’s classes in Fall 2025, which violates the standards of Cornell Faculty Handbook section 6.6 and amounts to punishment without process.

   As discussed at the Faculty Senate meeting, Policy 6.4 procedures lawfully meet the Title VI requirement that universities investigate and take prompt action to respond to discrimination complaints. Title VI does not require universities to use a particular standard of proof that universities must use in their grievance or complaint procedures. Cornell has lawfully adopted Policy 6.4 with the “clear and convincing evidence” standard used for the hearing by the Faculty Senate Committee on Academic Freedom. This evidence standard is appropriate when faculty face serious charges and comports with longstanding AAUP due process standards for proceedings that may result in severe sanctions.

   Log in to Reply

6. In support of this Resolution, I would like to provide a perspective on academic freedom itself and why it is so important. This principle may seem abstract to scholars in some fields, especially those whose research is primarily technical, quantitative or experiment-driven. I am a scholar in the humanities, however, where academic freedom is a fundamental principle without which the day-to-day work of research and teaching would not be possible. The same is true in the arts, the qualitative social sciences, law, ILR, and numerous fields and subfields in other colleges.

   My colleague Deborah Starr, Chair of Near Eastern Studies, has spoken eloquently about the negative impact on her field of policies supposedly meant to protect against antisemitism, for example the forced adoption by universities of the IHRA definition of antisemitism which would effectively make it impossible even to teach the history of Judaism or the history of Israel; she has also shared with us an important study of self-censorship (https://criticalissues.umd.edu/news/marc-lynch-and-shibley-telhami-middle-east-scholar-barometer-findings-scholars-who-study ) by scholars working on Israel and/or Palestine and its negative impact on the development of these scholarly fields—even on topics completely unrelated to politics. I urge you to take a look at it, since it evokes very well the real-world consequences of academic freedom and what happens when congressional leaders, administrators, or others sideline disciplinary expertise and dictate to scholars what they can or cannot do in their classrooms.

   Regarding the case we’ve been discussing, it’s important that the course Eric Cheyfitz taught last semester, and that he asked the student complainant to leave, was an undergraduate seminar offered by the program in Indigenous Studies. A humanities seminar is very different than a lecture in terms of what it demands both of the instructor and the students. The students are expected to have read the assigned materials for the class session and to come to class prepared to discuss them; they are expected to engage in reasoned discussions with their peers that are mediated by those readings and supported with textual evidence. Seminars are devoted to the analysis of texts and argumentative claims and to the development of students’ own analytic capacities and writing skills. This collective work is possible only if the students honor that contract and the instructor enforces it.

   Katie King incorrectly stated at Wednesday’s session that Professor Cheyfitz gave no rationale for excluding the complainant from his class other than, allegedly, his national origin. This is false on two counts. First, Cheyfitz expressly gave the student permission to take his class with full knowledge that he was Israeli. The student contacted him prior to the start of the semester and asked for permission to join, permission which he would have needed to enroll since he was a graduate student in a different college seeking to take an undergraduate course in A&S. Second, the undergraduate students in the seminar complained to Cheyfitz about the student’s disruptive presence in the course, and asked him to do something about it. Nine of those thirteen students co-authored an editorial in the Cornell Sun in which they wrote:

   “While every other member of the class demonstrated a shared commitment to being part of an academic community of questions and dialogue, it was immediately clear that [the complainant] had come to disrupt. In one instance, while we were engaged in a discussion about the Geneva Convention on Genocide, he began an abrupt and irrelevant tirade unequivocally justifying Israel’s bombing of Gaza. With his interjections, it was obvious that [the student] did not join the class to engage in discussions about the reading material or have good-faith conversations about indigeneity and genocide. [His] participation in the course led only to tension and stood in the way of other students’ ability to participate in class conversations freely and without judgement. Many of us were particularly disturbed by these incidents and approached Professor Cheyfitz with fears that we were being recorded with the intention of doxxing us later. [The complainant’s] actions even led a Palestinian student to drop the class — because they felt that Prof. Cheyfitz was actually being too tolerant in his interactions with [the student], allowing his disruptions to take up excessive class time.”

   The conduct described here, which was considered by the Academic Freedom Committee that evaluated the case, would violate the most fundamental rules of engagement for any seminar–including the rights of other students to participate freely without harassment or fear of doxxing–and would certainly require some action on the part of the instructor. I myself have encountered this situation on two occasions, both involving a graduate student who wished to participate in an undergraduate seminar but who was not doing the reading, was taking up class time with comments or statements not related to the course materials, or intimidating or belittling other seminar participants. On both occasions I had to speak to the graduate student about these issues. In one case that person changed his behavior and was allowed to stay, in the other I had to ask her to leave.

   The right to participate in a class is of a special kind, because a classroom–unlike a polling place or a restroom–is not a public space. It is accessible only under certain conditions, including but not limited to enrollment at the university. We have heard a lot about the rights of the student to “access” the course, which he was not denied; the right to access a course does not mean that one can stay under any conditions, however. While we consider carefully—as we must—the civil rights of this or any other complainant, we also need to consider the rights of other undergraduate students to access and participate in a course that was actually designed for them. This is in part why the Faculty Senate Committee on Academic Freedom and Professional Status exists, and why existing university policy recognizes the professor’s right to appeal to it.

   Professor Lieberwitz presented very clearly, I thought, not only that federal law does indeed recognize the right of universities to determine how discrimination claims will be investigated and decided—including with the use of a different evidentiary standard—but also that there are specific and compelling reasons for this. As we see in this case, the claim is not as simple as whether a given student had the right to access a given course, but includes a broader context in which the aims of education itself are at stake as well as the academic freedom prerogatives of professors and students.

   Finally, I wish to highlight Professor Babcock’s point that “In a court of law, where a judge or jury will consider allegations of discrimination like those alleged here, the plaintiff (here, the student) would have to show a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. This is not the end of the story, however. The defendant would then have an opportunity to show that there was a non-discriminatory reason for their action (e.g., the student was disruptive). The burden then shifts back to the student again to show that the non-discriminatory reason was a pretext, and that the real reason was to discriminate on a prohibited basis. This process is also described in the same manual I linked to above: https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual6

   We all understand that we are not relitigating this settled case. Instead, this resolution is about a fundamental procedural question: whether the university can unilaterally disregard the rules when it sees fit. This is something that should concern all of us as faculty members, and I urge others to vote “yes” for that reason.

   Log in to Reply

7. My understanding is that once the Academic Freedom Committee of the Faculty Senate rules on a case, its decision cannot be overturned. While a punishment could be modified by the Dean or Provost, a punishment cannot be added when none was recommended. So the issue is whether or not the procedures in place will be respected or summarily ignored at will. Whether or not those procedures should be changed is not what is at issue in this vote.

   Log in to Reply

   • Could you please share the text showing that a punishment cannot be added when none was recommended? This is the text supporters of the resolution continue to say exists, but which opponents of the resolution cannot locate.

     If you can provide the origin of this text, I think it would help us all a lot.

     Log in to Reply

8. I’ve followed this closely as a senator and interested faculty member. Having attended both Senate meetings this month, I’ve learned more about the sequence of events in the Cheyfitz case than I was able to glean from media coverage. I still have a few questions.

   Suppose something happens related to a class that leads to a student complaint. To whom or to what university entity does the student complain? Certainly some complaints are clearly matters for the Cornell Office of Civil Rights — sexual harassment, etc. — and some aren’t — e.g. professor made student “uncomfortable” by stating some opinion in class. Some complaints, though, hover in a limbo where a reasonable person could be undecided as to whether the complaint pertained to a civil-rights matter or to an academic-freedom matter. My question: who or what entity decides in such fuzzy cases what university entity will address the complaint? Does the complainant decide, i.e. can a complainant insist that COCR address a complaint rather than AFPS? I just don’t know the rules and am curious.

   Considering the Cheyfitz case specifically, it seems odd to me that a ruling from COCR based on a preponderance-of-evidence standard would be subject to appeal to AFPS with a clear-and-convincing standard. That said, the issue I raised above — who decides whether COCR investigates? — makes me wonder how exactly COCR ended up involved in the first place. Again, who decides where to refer a complaint?

   At today’s meeting, an AFPS member commenting over Zoom mentioned that COCR declined to engage with AFPS during AFPS’s deliberations. I found that disappointing to say the least. If one university entity makes a ruling subject to appeal to another university entity, and that second entity invites the first to help with their appeal deliberations, common courtesy dictates that the first entity at least offer a rationale for declining to participate. Not a good look for COCR.

   Log in to Reply

   • According to the enabling resolution, AFPS determines if AFPS should review the case. This should be obviously a problem – it is absurd to remove all external oversight. This particular case highlights the problem – AFPS is only supposed to become involved in cases that involve academic freedom, or the supervisor/trainee relationship. Neither was at stake here – this was explicitly a civil rights case from start to finish. The appeal should have been rejected.

     Perhaps it’s a bad look for COCR to have not participated in AFPS deliberations (although I imagine any such participation would have rapidly been twisted into an unfair administrative interference in AFPS procedure). It’s a far worse look for AFPS that it accepted the appeal, despite university policy clearly spelling out that AFPS had no role at all.

     Log in to Reply

9. For any who weren’t at the senate meeting Oct. 8, Provost Bala clarified at least some of what happened. The first committee to review the charges did so using the legally required ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard. The second committee did so using a ‘clear and compelling’ standard – this is a stricter standard, and is NOT allowed by federal legislation for discrimination cases like this.

   So the administration had literally zero choice but to overrule the second committee, and return to the findings of the first, since the second used a standard which it was not legally allowed to use.

   Log in to Reply

   • As Sandra Babcock and others emphasized during last week’s meeting, there are two questions at issue here and they need to be kept distinct. The administration’s opening presentation was aimed almost entirely at confusing them. The two questions are (A) the substance of the complaint brought against Eric Cheyfitz in his capacity as teacher of AIIS 3500 in S ’25, and (B) the procedures for ajudicating the complaint. The resolution sponsored by Sandra Babcock, by me, and by more than 100 CU faculty members, is directed entirely at (B): the AFPSF, as mandated by Policy 6.4, unanimously found that the evidence for (A)—for which none of us not in the administration or on the AFPSF itself has full knowledge—did not demonstrate discrimination, so no sanction was proposed. The university and college administration found this result unacceptable and superseded it with their own finding, on the basis of which Cheyfitz was not allowed to teach his fall ’25 classes. The justification for this vacating of the AFPSF’s finding that has been presented to us now repeatedly was that the “clear and convincing” standard that has been used by the ASPSF for the last 30 years was higher than was appropriate (or, to use the adjective introduced at the meeting,”wise”) for the present case, for which, with a view not towards the internal Cornell processes but to federal codes, the appropriate standard was “preponderance of evidence”. It is entirely the administration’s vacating of the procedure followed “pursuant to Policy 6.4” that the resolution addresses and proposes censure of. That the administration’s handling of the case in the way they have constitutes an attack and diminishment of faculty authority to ajudicate the kinds of question the complaint raises—the conduct of academic courses—can perhaps be illustrated, for those who doubt it, by considering an alternative: if the administration and the university counsel felt that in current political circumstances the “clear and convincing” standard used by the AFPSF was no longer “wise”, and that the standard should be lowered to the “preponderance of evidence” standard used in comparable federal contexts, why could they not have asked the AFSPF to re-consider their finding using that different standard? Instead, they simply vacated—overruled—the faculty committee’s finding.
     Those who have spoken and now written against the resolution for the most part either ignore this last point, confusing the two standards (in the meeting Prof. Birman charged the sponsors with dishonesty by citing federal codes for standards of evidence, even though others in the meeting had made it clear—and the university counsel had conceded, inviting us to “partner with” her in revising Policy 6.4—that the standard used within CU for the last 30 years had been the “clear and convincing” standard used by the AFSPF in this case) or by judging the merits of (B) on the basis of their necessarily underinformed understanding of (A), the facts of the case.
     The resolution is not about Eric Cheyfitz; it was occasioned by the administration’s handling of a case concerning Eric Cheyfitz. That this case did not arise in a political vacuum does not need to be repeated. But let’s try to keep the differences clear.

     Log in to Reply

     • “the AFPSF, as mandated by Policy 6.4, unanimously found that the evidence for (A)—for which none of us not in the administration or on the AFPSF itself has full knowledge—did not demonstrate discrimination, so no sanction was proposed.”

       But they didn’t. This is really, really important. They did not do that. They found that the civil rights claim did not meet the standard of Clear and Compelling. That is it. We heard, during our last meeting, from someone on the AFPSF panel, that the claim DID probably still meet the standard of “Preponderance of Evidence” in his opinion. So there was never any point in this process where a Preponderance of Evidence did not suggest wrongdoing on the part of Dr. Cheyfitz.

       Further – you (frankly incorrectly) mention what people against the resolution ignore. The sponsors and supporters continue to ignore the very next sentence in Policy 6.4. Immediately following “The dean or equivalent unit head must accept the Committee’s findings of fact and conclusions. ” – ” However, he or she may modify the Committee’s recommended sanctions.” This is hardly the only part of policy 6.4 that demonstrates the failings of the resolution, but it’s certainly one of the clearest.

       We have been told that this only kicks in if the AFPSF said ‘guilty’, but that language is not in the text anywhere. The entire text is simply that the dean or equivalent unit head may modify the recommended sanctions. Period.

       Further – this entire discussion ignores that ‘dean or head of unit’ is the one who is bound by AFPSF in any way – the Provost is transparently neither, and thus is not bound by this legislation in any way.

       This is the major flaw – AFPSF is never indicated to be the last word in any way, shape, or form.

       If the resolution is entirely about protocol and procedure? Protocol and procedure were followed – the sponsors have yet to demonstrate any way in which this is not true.

       Log in to Reply

       • This point keeps coming up. If no sanction is recommended there is no sanction to modify. It is not cogent to bring up operations on mathematical zeroes; a sanction is either brought into existence or it does not exist.

         Log in to Reply

         • Can you please supply the text that indicates that this is the case? Because that is NOT the text in Policy 6.4. It does not say, anywhere, that if there is no sanction recommended, the sanction cannot be modified. Perhaps there is another university policy that DOES say this, of which many of us have not been made aware.

           But Policy 6.4 does not say that. It simply says that the sanction can be modified. There is no textual requirement that a sanction first be suggested by AFPSF for that to happen. Perhaps there should be, but there isn’t. And as several of the supporters of this resolution have rightly indicated – the policy is what it is, not what we might wish it to be. We should be basing decisions on what is written, not on what we would prefer be written.

           And this really seems to be the very heart of the matter – whether AFPSF is the last word or not. Policy 6.4 makes it very clear that AFPSF is not the last word, except in terms of the dean or head of unit being bound to take AFPSF’s finding of fact as true. And we have no evidence at all that this did not happen – no evidence at all that the relevant dean did not believe that the civil rights case failed at a higher standard of evidence that the first investigation had used, per the reported findings of AFPSF.

           So again: if you could please provide the text that shows that you cannot modify the sanction if no sanction is proposed by ASPSF, that would be appreciated. Because I can’t find it anywhere, and the cited text from Policy 6.4 says exactly the opposite – that the sanction can be modified, full stop.